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SCIENTIFIC METHOD AND EVOLUTION1 
FERNANDO CANALE 
Andrews University 
Is the epistemological certainty of evolutionary theory so absolute that 
Christian theologians should feel rationally compelled to accept its conclusions 
even if they explicitly contradict the teachings of biblical revelation on the 
origm of life on our planet? To answer this question we need to turn our 
attention to the scientific method employed in the formation of evolutionary 
theory. Specifically, we need to become aware of the concrete form in which 
the empirical method described in the previous article is shaped when scientists 
use it to explain the origins of life on earth. 
In the frrst article of this series, our brief epistemological analysis of the 
scientific method in the empirical sciences reveals at least two main 
characteristics of scientific knowledge. First, scientific methodology is able to 
produce only hypothetical results. In other words, by applying scientific 
methodology scientists arrive at tentative, conjectural, hypothetical 
explanations-never at fmal absolute truth. Second, scientific hypotheses can 
only reach a limited and relative certainty-never absolute truth. Scientific 
knowledge is always relative to the presupposed theories from related fields and 
the macro-hermeneutical metaphysical presuppositions scientists assume to 
interpret their data and construct their explanations. We need to ask whether 
the evolutionary theory results from the application of the scientific method 
described above and, therefore, inherits its characteristics and limitations or 
whether it results from the application of a different sort of scientific 
methodology. 
The fact is, however, that "not all sciences are created equal."' Differences 
between sciences are determined by the object of study they attempt to clarify 
(teleological condition). Due to the object it attempts to explain and the data 
from which it draws its conclusion, evolutionism works with a method that is 
substantially different from the method of the empirical sciences described 
above. In ths article, then, I will begin by describing the difference between 
empirical and evolutionary methodologes. Then I will consider the conditions 
and procedures under and through which the method operates. Finally, I will 
reflect on the corroboration and epistemological status of evolutionary theory. 
'Fernando Canale, "Evolution, Theology and Method Part I: Outline and Limits of Scientific 
Methodology," AUSS 41 (2003): 65-100 is the first of a series of three articles. 
2David L. Hull, "The Particular-Circumstance Model of Scientific Explanation," in Hidory 
and Ewfution, ed. Matthew H. Nitecki and Doris V. Nitecki (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1992), 70. 
Historical N a t m  
"What we are doing when teaching Darwin's biotic hstory to out biology 
students is pure hi~tory,"~ writes M. H. Nitecki. This is so because evolution in 
general focuses "on the interpretation of individual historical events--events 
destined never to be repeated as time marches on."4 There is a distinction 
between nonhistorical sciences such as physics and chemistry, which focus on 
the immutable laws of nature, and historical sciences such as geology, 
paleontology, and evolutionary biology, which attempt to reconstruct the 
physical and biological history of our planet. Epistemologists of evolutionary 
science are aware of this distinction and the problems it poses to the scientific 
status of evoluti~n.~ 
The scientific status of evolution becomes problematic because the myth 
of science and the more modest description of the scientific method described 
above have been modeled after the likeness of nodustorical disciplines such as 
physics and  hemi is try.^ For this reason, evolutionists recognize that "the study 
of history is a discipline seemingly in search of, so far, very elusive theories or 
law."' They are forced to answer Popper's view that history is not a science 
because it is not interested in &ding universal laws but in knowing concrete 
realities,8 and h s  conviction that Darwinism is meta~h~s ics .~  Robert J. Richards 
recognizes that "evolutionary biology still does not meet the logical criteria that 
Popper proposed for science. That is because it is historical and suffers from 
the presumed disabilities of all history attempting to pass as s~ience."'~ The 
question about the scientific status of the historical sciences, vis-i-vis the 
nonhistorical ones, such as the social sciences, arises." 
Not surprisingly, evolutionists strongly defend the scientific status of 
'Matthew H. Nitecki, "History: La Grande Illusion," in Hi~tory andEuohtion, ed. Matthew H .  
Nitecki and Doris V. Nitecki (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 5. 
'Niles Eldredge, The Pattern gEvohtion (New York: Freeman, 1999), 8. 
5 F ~ r  a discussion of the way evolutionists attempt to solve the challenges presented by the 
historical nature of their investigation, see Marc Ereshefsky, "The Historical Nature of 
Evolutionary Theory," in Idistory and Ewhtwn, ed. Matthew H .  Nitecki and Doris V. Nitecki 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 81-99. 
6Robert J. Richards, "The Structure of Narrative Explanation in History and Biology," in 
Histoy and Ewlulion, ed. Matthew H .  Nitecki and Doris V. Nitecki (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, l992), 19. 
'Nitecki, 5. 
'David B. Kitts, "The Conditions for a Nomothetic Paleontology," in History and Evohtion, 
ed. Matthew H .  Nitecki and Doris V. Nitecki (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 
131-145. 
"Nitecki, 8. 
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historical disciplines;" note that physical data are not ah~storical;'~ar~ue that 
historical explanations are the most fundamental explanations we find in 
science;14 draw parallels between science in the history of human events and 
science in the hstory of geologcal and biological events; and discard criticisms 
that historical sciences are "anecdotal," while the phenomena of physics are 
"the keys" that unlock the universe.15 The general conviction, then, is that 
history is or should be scientific.16 Rachel Laudan observes that in both biology 
and hstory "hstorical explanations are similar and either none is, or both are, 
equally 'good science,' and the methodologies of general hstory and 
evolutionary biology are homologous."17 
These affirmations of the scientific status of historical science, however, miss 
the main difference that exists between historical sciences such as geology and 
paleontology, and empirical sciences such as physics and chemistry. The 
difference appears when one compares the teleological condition in empirical and 
historical sciences, i.e., what each attempts to explain. Succinctly put, empirical 
sciences explain present and future realities, while historical sciences explain absent 
and past realities. Moreover, empirical sciences attempt to discover general 
patterns in yh'cal r e ~ m n t  events, while historical sciences attempt to reconstruct, 
interpret, and discover general patterns in hear unique events. 
Empirical sciences explain the present by searching for sameness, and by 
finding repetitive patterns in nature they can predict the future. Their celebrated 
successes depend on the cyclical-repetitive nature of the subject matter they 
study (the teleological condition they embrace). The description of the 
empirical scientific method we studred in the first article of this series is tailored 
to research repetitive cyclical reahties in nature.18 
Historical sciences attempt to reconstruct the past-not explain general 
recurrent patterns. This difference in the teleologcal condition of method 
determines that historical sciences reach a lower level of reliability and 
corroboration than physical sciences studyrng repetitive cycles of nature. Thus, 
lk'Marc Ereshefsky argues that the distinction between evolutionary biology and such 
nonhistorical sciences as physics and chemistry are [id not clear, and that in both evolutionary 
biology and experimental sciences there is a temporal ordering of events, the use of how-possibility 
explanations, the uniqueness of events, and the reliance on particular-circumstance explanations" 
(ibid., 7). 
'"Yet it does not follow that the data of physics are ahistorical. It is obvious that all 
phenomena, however brief, have a temporal component and that it is the behavior of entities of 
the material universe over stretches of time-be they nanoseconds or billions of years-that 
provides the human mind with an opportunity to grapple with the furniture of the universe" 
(Eldredge, 12, emphasis original) 
16Rachel Laudan, 'What's so special about the past?," in History and Evolution, ed. Matthew 
H. Nitecki and Doris V. Nitecki (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 57. 
"Nitecki, 6. 
physicists reconstructing the first seconds in the history of our universe face the 
same problems and limitations that evolutionists do in reconstructing the 
hstory of life. What results in both cases are explanatory theories inferred from 
present knowledge. But, by projecting inferences from the present to the 
unavailable past, scientific method can attain only probable results-falling far 
short of the relative certainty of present cyclical events. 
The scientific reconstruction of the past results from combined 
contributions of several scientific disciplines, notably, physics, geology, 
paleontology, and biology. Of these four, the method in paleontological sm&s 
replicates more closely methodologies used in the reconstruction and 
interpretation of human events.l9 The rllfference between human hstory and 
biologcal hstory is the types of documents available and the different character 
of the causes: "genetics, interaction of species, geological changes, and so 
Finally, because evolution is a hstorical science, its method and outcome take 
the form of narrative. Th~s  means that "all explanations of events in time are 
ultimately narrative in str~cture."~' Narratives explain by ordering "events along 
a temporal dunension, so that prior events are understood to have given rise to 
subsequent events and thereby to explain them-that, in brief, is what narratives 
do."" Evolution, thus, is properly a cosmogonic metanarrative explaining the 
origin and history of life's development on planet Earth. Let us turn our attention 
now to the conditions operating in the scientific method applied to the study of 
the physical, geological, and biological history of our world. 
Teleological Condition 
Evolutionary theory aims to understand and explain the historical process 
through which the present came into existence. Evolutionists attempt to 
understand past events that explain the present. The heart of hstorical 
explanation is to follow the order of causes behind present realities, thereby 
allowing humans to understand the world and themselves. We must distingush, 
then, between events and their interpretations. When paleontologists speak of 
"facts" they mean that a past event actually took place.23 By speahng about past 
events as "facts" many evolutionists "may be implymg, or at least be forgetting 
to avoid assuming, that the events of the past not only actually occurred, but 
that they are the irreducible raw material with whch all hgher inferential 
operations in hstory begin."24 To assume that past events caused present 
events is an acceptable general assumption. After all, since Aristotle we 
'"tts, 133. 
"Nitecki, 6. 
"Richards, 23. 
"Ibid. 
Z3Kitts, 132. 
241bid. 
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recognize that we know by identiffing "certain causes and principles."z5 
Because evolutionists start by accepting evolution as metanarrative, they run the 
risk of confusing the narrated events with the data from which those events are 
inferred. Yet, as IGtts reminds us, "hstorical events, however familtar they may 
become, and however routine the inferences that support them may seem to 
be, lie not at the beginning of our quest for synthesis and historical 
understanding, but somewhere along the way."26 
To avoid this confusion, evolutionists should distinguish between their 
object of study (teleological conchtion) and the data they study (material 
condtion). Though past events properly play the role of teleological condition of 
method, they cannot offer data from whch to study them simply because they are 
not avadable to the scientists for observation and experiment. Past events, then, 
are not the data, but rather are questions facing evolutionist theory. 
The nonavailability of evolutionary events is ddferent from the 
nonavailability, for instance, of the atom. The unavadabdity of the latter is due 
to the size of apment reality, while the unavailabihty of the former is due to the 
totalabsence of the object, event, or causes the evolutionary theory attempts to 
explain. Thus, evolutionary theory is forced to explain by producing a 
metanarrative that creates past events through "scientifically controlled" 
inferences and irnagmation. This method of metaphysical construction is similar 
to the one followed when pre-Socratic philosophers constructed their 
cosmogonies. They also used "controlled speculation" from what was then 
"frrm" scientific knowledge to them. We have made progress in the amount 
and precision of what we today consider "fm" scientific knowledge of the 
world but stdl face the same methodological chfficulty confronted by the early 
Greek philosophers: the events that caused our present world no longer exist. 
The data of paleontology are the fossils, not the historical events they once 
were. Fossils are not historical events, but historical artifacts-the remains of 
life. In order to explain fossils' existence, paleontologists must frrst "irnagme" 
events as possible causes of the fossil record. In the process, they "create" 
events of whch we have no hstorical evidence. Macroevolutionary events 
belong to this category. Fossils, as the remains of life, testify to their past 
existence but say little about history, i.e., about the causal sequence that 
origmated the existence of such remains. There is also a distinction between the 
existence and the nature of the remains. Fossils testify to the existence of living 
organisms but apparently say little about the cause of their existence or about 
the nature of the indrvidual to which each fossil testifies. Reconstruction of life 
is very chfficult because of its complexity. Science is good at learning by 
isolating factors. It is difficult to see how science would be able to know by 
considering all factors at the same time, especially when one has no possible 
way to know all the ecological conditions that could have been present billions 
of years ago. 
Material Condition 
What sources of data do scientists have to work with to produce the 
evolutionist metanarrative? Basically they have two sources, the present 
patterns of life studied by biologsts,2' and the remains of death studied by 
paleontology. But biological data do not reveal duectly the macroevolutionary 
patterns required by evolutionary theory; and paleontological data, being 
controversial, spark disagreement among evolutionists about how to 
reconstruct the past and tell the ccstory'y of evolution.28 Thus, evolutionists warn 
us not to confuse specific models of evolution with its reality.29 
"It is not the case that biologists discovered evolution in observable facts, 
and then proceeded to explain it."30 Biologists have discovered only 
rnicroevolutionary patterns that fall far short of the macroevolutionary progress 
essential to evolutionary theory. Thus, biological studies help only partially to 
reconstruct an already assumed evolutionary history by providing a basis from 
which to draw indirect inferences. By themselves, biological data do not testify 
to macroevolution. It is only when evolutionary macro-hermeneutical 
presuppositions are applied that biological data become the launching pad from 
which inferences can be projected to the past to reconstruct and flesh out 
evolutionary history in some detail. 
The "fact" of the evolutionary narrative is established by paleontological 
studies. What data do paleontologists examine that tell them that life as we know 
it today came into existence through an unbelievably lengthy process of 
evolution? The fossil record is the silent witness from past life, which we 
encounter in our present. As a messenger from the past, the fossil record calls for 
rational explanation. Evolutionists claim evolution is the rational explanation for 
the origin of life and is, then, a better explanation of the fossil record. 
However, the fossil record is not "raw data," unambiguously pointing to 
evolution. "The fact that evolutionary paleontologists and biblical creationists 
invoke it with equal facihty is testimony to the ambiguities surrounding the very 
notion of a fossil record."31 Of course, for evolutionists such as David B. Kitts 
nc'My training in evolutionary theory, as for many organismal biologists of my generation, 
came from reading the works of the victors in the Evolutionary Synthesis, and through their 
students and followers. We learned that among the achievements of the Synthesis was the 
reconciliation between the genetical theory of evolutionary processes and rhe inferences of 
evolutionary history that emerge from the work of paleontologists, comparative morphologists, and 
systematists. That is, microevolutionary processes, suitably extrapolated through time, were 
sufficient to account for macroevoiutionary histories of change. There have always been those who 
did not accept this conclusion, however, and in recent years the tension between students of 
evolutionary history and of evolutionary processes has become considerably more palpable" 
(Douglas J. Futuyma, "History and Evolutionary Process," in History andEwhtion, ed. Matthew H. 
Nitecki and Doris V. Nitecki [Albany: State University of New York Press, 19921, 103). 
"Ibid., 140. 
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these "ambiguities" are minor and do not preclude evolution--only its fine 
tuning. Their disagreements are not about whether evolution took place, but 
about how to better reconstruct the process through which it took place. What 
makes the difference between the creationist and evolutionist readings of the 
fossil record? Why are evolutionists so certain that evolution took place? The 
different interpretation of the fossil record produced by creationists and 
evolutionists is determined by the different sets of presuppositions used to 
interpret the data and deal with the data's ambiguities. This brings us to the 
core of evolutionary methodology, namely, the a priori hermeneutical 
conditions that make evolutionary theory possible. 
H e m e n e h a l  Conditions 
Since evolutionary theory came into existence by the combined interdisciplinary 
connections of geology, paleontology, and biology, we need to briefly consider 
their relation and the hermeneutical conditions wnder which they operate. My 
goal in this section is only to indicate some of the most influential conditions 
that make evolutionary theory possible. At the same time, the reader should 
bear in mind that if these conditions are challenged or defined in different 
ways, evolutionary theory must give way to an alternative explanation. 
By interpreting the crust of our planet and the fossil record, geology and 
paleontology have established a long chronological sequence for the history of 
life. Accepting this historical time table, biological evolution explains how life 
came into existence and developed into its present form by way of a 
metanarrative. In so doing, 
geologists and paleontologists escape almost entirely the suspicion of any 
intent to distort history. When they rewrite history, as they do from time to 
time, it is not likely to be seen as the result of a change of opinion, but rather 
of an advance in knowledge. Scientists, by and large, regard themselves and 
are regarded by others as people who settle the issues which divide them by 
an appeal to facts.32 
Yet, before geologists and paleontologists "begin their search for the past," 
they already "are committed to the view that whatever events they may propose 
as antecedents in explanations of the present, these events will be those that do 
not violate certain deeply held and widely shared theoretical notions.""That 
evolutionary methodology stands on a priori and hermeneutical conditions 
cannot be denied.34 To understand the process through which evolution is 
conceived and formulated, we need to consider at least some of the "theoretical 
notions" on which it stakds. 
In what follows, I will deal with some of the a priori presuppositions 
""Both evolutionary biology and history are equally subjective activities because both are 
influenced by the training and social standing o f  their respective practitioners; yet both claim to 
reach beyond their immediate circumstances" (Nitecki, 4-5). 
operative in the construction of the evolutionary theory. By "a priori" I mean 
a theory that has been formulated previously and independently from 
evolutionary theory and that stands without scientific testing (what Popper calls 
"metaphysical standing" because such theories have no physical corroboration). 
The macro-hermeneutical presuppositions under which theologans operate are 
basically the same ones assumed by scientists. We can summarize them in two 
main kinds, presuppositions about reality (the object to be studied) and 
presuppositions about the subject developing scientific theories (reason). Since 
I am leading with scientific methodology as used in the construction of 
evolutionary theory in this article, I will concentrate on ontologcal 
presuppositions. I will begin with the ontological macro-hermeneutical 
presuppositions at the basis of all the sciences and will continue with the meso- 
hermeneutical presuppositions that derive from the various dsciplines involved 
in the formulation of evolutionary theory. 
Ontological Macro-hermeneutical Presuppositions: 
A Priori Index of Reality: The Limits of 
Scientific Imagination 
Science studes reality. The frrst and broader assumptions that science originates 
from are about the nature and general extension of the reality that scientists 
research. Scientists assume two primary interrelated ontological notions. First, 
they assume reality to be spatiotemporal. This presupposition may appear 
obvious to scientists today, but in reality it represents a huge paradigmatic 
change from the classical notion of timeless science that started with Greek 
philosophy. The notion that reality is spatiotemporal left God out of 
phlosophical and scientific knowledge because philosophers and theologians 
had defined God's reality as timeless science. A science that studies what is 
temporal and spatial cannot accommodate the study of a timeless God. When 
evolutionists search for the biological hstory of the past, they leave God out 
because they do not find God in space and time today. However, neither do 
they fmd the events of evolution they so confidently consider "factual." The 
reason why God is left out is more than h s  objective absence from our present 
spatiotemporal causal order. It involves also the conviction that God could not 
have intervened within the spatiotemporal continuum at any time in the past. 
This conviction is grounded in the metaphysical assumption that God is 
timeless and therefore cannot act w i t h  the spatiotemporal continuum. 
Because of their commitment to the biblical view of God, Adventists do not 
assume the timeless view of God and therefore cannot dsplace God's historical 
causality as described in Scripture out of the realm of scientific research. Here 
Seventh-day Adventist theology radically departs from the presuppositions of 
science and most Christian theologies. 
Because God is left behind by scientific methodology, evolutionists 
beginning with Darwin are forced to solve not only issues such as the 
geographcal distributions of species, or the geologic column, but the 
EVOLUTION, THEOLOGY, AND METHOD, PART 2 173 
metaphysical question about the origin of life itself, an issue that falls far 
beyond the reach of science. One assumption in science is that nothing comes 
out of nothing. In its present state, scientists have a hard time accepting this 
assumption about origins. Either the world is eternal or it had a beginning.35 If 
it had a beginrung, then the God hypothesis disturbs the otherwise tranqd 
waters of scientific assumptions. If it did not have a beginning, the question of 
origin, which the big-bang theory and evolution attempt to answer, is irrelevant. 
Evolutionary scientists recognize the existence and operation of macro- 
herrneneutical ontologd presuppositions only indirectly. For instance, Kitts 
says that "the study of history can be a rational enterprise only if some 
restriction is placed upon what we ma_y suppose to have occurred. In what may 
be considered the mainstream of hstorical studies we are not, as James Hutton 
put it (1795:547), '. . . to make nature act in violation of that order which we 
actually observe."'36 Speaking about the credibility of hstorical evolutionary 
narratives, Robert J. Richards tells us that they must adjust to the "index of 
reality," whch, among other things, includes the "grain of the reader's f m  
knowledge."37 As we will see below, the reader's "firm knowledge" is 
determined from the present by the scientific community. The notion that 
&vine causation in history is real falls outside the "index of reality" from which 
scientists have chosen to bulld their cosmogony. Leaving God outside 
science's horizon results from the acceptance of a naturalistic philosophical 
ontology without scientific corroboration. This assumption leaves out divine 
interventions in creation and the flood. This is a methodological decision which 
not only stands on philosophical rather than scientific grounds, but may 
actually guide scientists astray in the case that reality is not reduced to 
naturalistic causes, as they dogmatically assume. We now turn our attention to 
the micro-hermeneutical (disciplinary) presuppositions operating in 
evolutionary theory. 
Geology Assumes Physics 
Geology is the paradigm science responsible for drawing the broad outhe of 
earth history on which paleontology and evolutionary theory Thus, the 
hermeneutical presuppositions guiding geological theories also become 
presuppositions of evolutionary theory. Among some of the micro-hermeneutical 
presuppositions leadmg geological research are the theories of physics, the science 
"This is a limit of human reason we cannot overcome that Kant already recognized as the 
fourth antinomy of pure reason (see his Critique o f P m  Reason, trans. J. M. D. Meiklejohn [Buffalo, 
NY: Prometheus, 19901,257-258 [third conflict of transcendental ideas]). 
3s"Geology is the paradigm historical science. Its goal has been the discovery of events and 
relationships among events that, being beyond the range of observation, can only be reached in 
historical inferences, albeit inferences subject to the prior external constraint of physical theory" 
(ICtts, 138). 
that studies the most general aspects of natural reality. Kitts explicitly recognizes 
the hermeneutical role of physical theory in evolution in the following way: 
Physical theory does not serve as a set of axioms by which aIl geological 
knowledge must be validated. It serves rather as a source of guiding principles 
for historical research, and a limitpenwitring us to choose among altbe accountts ofthe 
part which are consistent with the present state o f  the earth, And in any quest for a 
nomothetic geology it would serve as a source of justification for claims that 
some geological hypotheses are to be accorded theoretical status (emphasis 
supplied).39 
Notice the hermeneutical role played by physics. It guides in choosing among 
several theories that are consistent with the present state of the earth. In other 
words, reason and scientific methodology allow geologists to deal with the 
evidence in several ways. In order to select from among them, geologists use the 
guidance of physical theories. Assumed physical theories, in turn, have been 
conceived by bracketing out divine causality from the spatiohistorical continuum 
as required by ontological presuppositions. Let us now consider some specific 
assumptions from which geologists reconstruct the history of our planet. 
Geology Assumes that the Present is 
the Key to the Past 
In geological studes, we find a rnicro-hermeneutical expression of the ontologml 
macro-hermeneutical assumption that nature embraces all reality and causes. 
Causes in geology "can be understood in large measure through observation of 
the world in which we now live."40 If this is so, studying the present allows 
scientists to determine what could have taken place in the past, i.e., scientists may 
determine the precise shape of the "index" of reality to guide their extrapolations 
of present geological events to the past.41 In geology, the assumption that the 
present becomes our key to the past became embded  in uniformitarianism and 
gradualism. Hutton, the father of geology, formulated uniformitarianism as the 
assumption standing behind the notion that the present is the key to the past. 
Methodological uniformitarianism is the essence of Hutton's gift to history. 
Gould notes that it amounts to nothing more, or less, than inductive 
reasoning: We make an underlying ontological assumption that physical 
processes operating in the material universe remain the same, from the 
earliest appearance of particular classes of material furniture, up through the 
present momentum, and continuing for as long as such classes offurniturn 
continue to exist (emphasis ~riginal)?~ 
"Theologians should notice that this principle is also at the center o f  the analogy principle 
on which the historical critical method of Bible interpretation stands; see Ernst Troeltsch, Rckgion 
in H i ~ t o v  (Minneapolis, M N :  Fortress, 1991), 13-14. In geology, this notion was articulated by 
Charles Lyell; see Eldredge, 34. 
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Another assumption on which geology builds its reconstruction of the past 
is the principle of gradualism, according to which "no additional processes not 
observable in the present underlie elements of earth and evolutionary history. 
Melded with methodological uniformitarianism, gradualism accounted for many 
of the early triumphs of geology and biology" (emphasis original).43 
From the paleontological perspective, Niles Eldredge has perceived the 
inconsistency of these principles with the fossil record and has challenged 
them;44 yet he continues to apply the results to which paleontology and 
evolutionary theory have arrived. Of course, due to the combined effect of the 
object they have set themselves to study-the origin of life on our planet-and 
the ontological constraints of naturalism, there are not many options avadable 
to explore. Besides, since geologsts, paleontologists, and evolutionary 
biologists study the past-a nonexistent reality-they can hardly dispense with 
the principle of uniformitarianism whch grounds the analogy between the two 
poles within which their methodological extrapolations take place. Without 
methodological uniformitarianism, evolutionary theory could not exist. 
Adventist scientists, on the other hand, cannot accept the naturalistic 
assumption, and are free to explore other possibilities." 
Geology Assumes Deep Time 
By applying the presuppositions described above, geology arrived at the 
conclusion that to properly account for the history of our planet, deep time was 
ne~essary.~~ Methodologically speaking, a main foundation on which the 
evolutionary theory of the origin of life stands is the notion of deep time, which 
grows out of geological studies. The notion of deep time (i.e., long periods of 
time measured in billions of years) started as a w o r h g  hypothesis that today 
is considered a proven fact because of absolute time measurements. Deep time 
was first deduced (1 820-1 870) as a condition of observations of sedimentation- 
erosion to explain geological  observation^^^ by deterrnhing "what is older than 
what."48 Since 1905, technology measuring radioactivity was used to establish 
absolute time calculations in contrast with the old comparative method~logy.~~ 
These methods obviously are not theory- or presupposition-free. They operate 
4SNaturalistic ontology denies the existence of God or his involvement in our universe and 
its history, notions which are necessary hermeneutical conditions of Adventist beliefs. If Adventist 
scientists accept naturalistic ontology, then they cease to think as Adventists. They may relate to 
the community at a social level but no longer at the level o f  its message and mission. 
4 6 F ~ r  an overview of deep time see Verne Grant, The Evohtionaty Pmcen: A Cdical Rew'ew of 
Evolutionary Pmcess (New York: Columbia University Press, 1985), 275-283. 
within the general hermeneutical matrix that supports evolutionary theory. 
Deep-time measurement is a complex issue that needs to be investigated 
at the theoretical and procedural levels. Adventist thought has room for deep 
time due to the existence of the conflict between God and evil before creation 
week.50 Thus, Scripture allows for deep time in the material components of our 
planet but not in the life forms existing on it. 
Paleontology Assumes Geology 
Once deep time was established, geology generated a general chronology of 
events." Whde studying sedimentary strata geologists found fossils, which are 
studied by paleontologists. Unlike geology, paleontology cannot have direct, but 
only indirect, access to past biological events through the fossil record. In so 
doing, paleontologists assume the chronology and geologc column constructed 
by geologists. For Hutton and Darwin, the history of earth was written in the 
rocks of its The sequence of fossils in general is invariably repeated. 
Darwin's evolutionary hypothesis made it possible to understand the fossil 
record and the deep-time chronology set out by geology.53 
Evolutionary Biology Assumes 
Evolutionary Paleontology 
The study of evolution assumes the history of evolution reconstructed by 
paleontologsts by drawing inferences from the fossil record, whose chronology 
is drawn by assuming biological ev~lution.~' So biological evolution assumes 
paleontology, and paleontology assumes geology and biological evolution. 
This brief sample of macro- and micro-herrneneutical presuppositions and 
the interdisciplinary effort necessary to support biological evolution suggests 
the theoretical complexity on which evolutionary theory stands. 
As we explained earlier, method is basically an action. What is the rational 
"action" scientists perform when building the theory of evolution? The major 
?See Richard M. Davidson, "The Biblical Account of Origins," JATS 14/1 (2003): 4-43; and 
Randall W. Younker, "Understanding Genesis 1 and 2: A Look at Some Current Issues," 
unpublished paper delivered at the International Faith and Science Conference sponsored by the 
General Conference of Seventh-day Adventists (Ogden, UT: General Conference of Seventh-day 
Adventists, August 25,2002). 
54"The study of evolution is fundamentally a study of history. The patterns of diversity that 
ultimately motivate most of us to study evolution cannot be understood without reference to this 
history, whether it beglunpsed through paleontology or phylogenetic analysis; and the evolutionary 
mechanisms that act on any population do so within bounds set by the population's history" 
(Futuyma, 123). 
EVOLUTION, THEOLOGY, AND METHOD, PART 2 177 
methodologcal procedure involved in the construction of evolutionary history 
is empirical inference.55 Geologists infer from the paleontologists infer 
from the fossil record interpreted from the background of geological time and 
chronology,5' biologists infer from their observation of present biological 
processes.58 The present is not only the key to the past, but the springboard 
from which the past is reconstructed by literally imagining large events not 
present to the  scientist^.^^ Thus, the rational procedure through whch the 
evolutionary metanarrative is constructed is inference. 
What do scientists do when they infer the past from the present? What is an 
inference? The dictionary tells us that to infer is the act of passing from one 
statement to another or of deriving conclusions from facts or premises. But how 
do scientists derive their conclusions from their present facts to reconstruct the 
absent past? They do not draw wild conclusions such as guessing in the dark, as, 
for instance, we do when brainstorming. What makes an inference scientific is 
that it takes place w i t h  an assumed theoretical context or "scenario" within 
whch it "makes sense" and gains its "ratianahty."60 Scientific inference, then, 
5SEmpirical inference differs from logical inference in that empirical inference starts from a 
spatiotemporal experience while logical inference starts with the meaning of statements. 
56c'Geology is the paradigm historical science. Its goal has been the discovery of events and 
relationships among events that, being beyond the range of observation, can only be reached in 
historical inferences, albeit inferences subject to the prior external constraint of physical theory" 
(Kitts, 138). Moreover, "the significant principles of physical theories can be directly instantiated 
by the objects with which geologists begin their inferences and, consequently, more or less directly 
by the antecedent events meant to explain them" (ibid., 139). The first part of Kitts's statement is 
true, but to say that physical principles may be directly instantiated by the historical reconstruction 
of causes (theory of the earth) is not correct. Instantiation takes place through experiment or direct 
observation, which is impossible in the case of historical events. 
57crSecondary historical events are, on the other hand, uniquely historical. They have no 
counterpart in the present. They are composed of primary events related in a spatial and temporal 
nexus. Some of the temporal relationships among the primary events composing a secondary event 
are secured by causal generalization linking events of certain kinds, but others are related by 
noncausal ordering principles [chronological dating from geology and paleontology]" (ibid., 137). 
"K~tts, 137, calls the events that result from this kind of inference "primary historical events," 
which are based on researching present events available within the life span of the observer (136- 
137). "The question ofwhether or not such an event could occur or has occurred can, in principle, 
be settled by observation and experiment. Historical events of this kind differ from events we 
encounter in the present only by virtue of having occurred in the past. They are reached in primary 
historical inferences" (ibid., 137). 
'"'The properties which biology identifies as theoretically significant, such as genetic 
variability, community structure and energy requirements are simply not to be instantiated in fossils 
nor are they in any direct and straightforward way to be inferredfin fossils. There is no mystery 
about this contrast between geology and paleontology. It is the result of the obvious fact that the 
living bodies and the remains of living bodies, which are the subject matter of biology, do not keep 
very well" (ibid., 139-1 40, emphasis original). 
60rc In  the primary historical inference it is supposed that certain states and events in the 
present are to be explained by linking them with certain states and events in the past. Because 
events do not point intrinsically beyond themselves to other events, causal connections between 
past and present must be justified by reference to universal laws or, more commonly, to less 
comprehensive and formal generalizations. A generalization plainly cannot be tested by the 
requires the henneneutical condition of method for its very existence; and, thus, 
scientific inferences cannot be tested. If we could test them, they would no longer 
be inferences but experiments or observations. When private investigators and 
lawyers attempt to reconstruct a crime, they use inferences from the "evidence" 
of the crime that remains in the present. Inferences require evidence (data) and 
an assumed scenario (herrneneutical  condition^).^' Circumstantial evidence is weak 
because it does not spring directly from the act one is tryulg to reconstruct. Juries 
find it difficult to arrive at unanimous verdicts on the basis of circumstantial 
evidence. That is to say, evidence and scenario allow for various contradictory 
interpretations of the same act. Somethmg similar takes place when scientists 
attempt to reconstruct the geological and biological histories of our planet.cWe 
have no direct evidence of macroevolution. Therefore, geological, paleontological, 
and biological data can construct only a n'mmstantialcase in favor of evolution 
that depends more on the a priori scenario than on the evidence!' 
The absence of evidence corroborating macroevolution is a difficult 
problem facing evolutionists. To be persuasive, inference must not depart from 
the premise or fact from which a prediction or projection is made. In other 
words, the nature and extension of the conclusion cannot exceed or 
substantially differ from the inferential basis. So, how can a macroevolutionary 
history be developed from a nonrnacroevolutionary basis? Eldredge suggests 
that evolutionism e~tra~olates.~'  It is not exactly clear what Eldredge means by 
"extrapolation" and in what way it differs from inference. If we understand 
"extrapolation" as the act through which we "project, extend, or expand 
(known data or experience) into an area not known or experienced so as to 
arrive at a usually conjectural knowledge of the unknown area,"64 then the 
problem is solved, but the price may be higher than evolutionists are willing to 
pay. That is to say, if macroevolution is built by extrapolation from evidence, 
then evolutionary theory is mere conjecture, supposition, and guesswork. 
explanatory inference in which it is presupposed, and there is good reason why attempts are seldom 
made to test universal laws in any historical context whatever. Physical and biological laws, and 
even the less rigorous generalizations which are often directly invoked in historical inferences, are 
tested under the most controlled and circumscribed conditions" (ibid., 133). 
6"'There are no theory-free events nor any uninterpreted chronicle composed of them" (ibid., 
134). Kitts says this while dealing with the role o f  theory in the construction of past natural history. 
This is not justifying knowledge, but projecting knowledge to the past by way of inference. What 
paleontologists do here is to build a history justifying it with generalizations from other sciences 
and from generalizations created from the study of the fossil record itself. 
"'Writing history consists of identifylng from among all the possible worlds permitted by 
some presupposed theory, the actual world. This involves describing the actual world in terms of 
the initial and boundary conditions which some theory identifies as relevant" (ibid., 135). 
63''So a connection had to be forged between uniformitarianism, gradualism, and 
reductionism: extriohtionism, the projection of commonly observed rates and processes as a 
prediction of what history ought to look like" (Eldredge, 40). 
64See Memiam- Webster Colhgktc Dictionary, 10th ed. (Springfield, MA: Merriam-Webster, 1993, 
S.V. "extrapolation." 
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Corroboration 
By hearing the news, watching scientific documentaries on TV, and listening to 
scientists speak, one gets the impression that evolution is a fact.65 By reading what 
evolutionary epistemologists say about the epistemological status of evolution, 
one gets the impression that, while not every* is crystal clear and there are still 
some rough edges to polish in evolutionary theorizing,66 evolution is a fact as 
certain as the fact that I am writing this article. For them, doubting evolution 
seems unthinkable. One assumes that conclusive proof of evolution exists. 
Otherwise, scientists and the general public would not be so sure about it. 
The brief epistemological analysis of the scientific method in empirical and 
evolutionary sciences has shown they do not produce absolute certainties, but 
only working possibilities in search of understanding. Moreover, we have 
discovered that due to the hstorical nature of the object it attempts to 
understand, evolutionary science has difficulties of its own that place its 
outcomes at a lower level than the outcomes of the ahistorical sciences, which 
study present repetitive natural phenomena. On the other hand, we have 
learned that scientists build theories to tear them down. Yet, that critical spirit 
mysteriously disappears when scientists speak about evolution and the history 
of the universe. Suddenly, absolute certainty appears out of nowhere. Is 
corroboration of evolution so strong that it is able to secure such a high level 
of rational certainty? How do we explain the absolute certainty scientists have 
about the "fact" that life on our planet evolved from nonexistence to the 
astonishing variety and complexity that exist today? It seems to me that 
evolutionary certainty is not empirical, but rational. 
In the fvst article of this series, we learned that scientific theories cannot 
be corroborated directly, but only indirectly.67 By deducing some empirical 
consequences from a theory, scientists place them under experiment to see if 
it reveals what the theory affirms. This testing obviously requires that the 
empirical consequences of the theory become cfirectly available, in the present, 
to the researcher. But in the case of evolutionism this can only be done partially 
because past events which the theory is all about cannot be placed under testing 
or experiment. 
Evolutionary biologists have tried to test the basic evolutionary notion, 
according to which higher forms of life appear from lower forms. The process 
of life, as biologists well know, is highly complex and sophsticated. 
Spe~iation,6~ i.e., the appearance of new sexually reproducing organisms, 
requires "from several hvindred to several thousand years to complete. To an 
65''Paleontologists seem to have expected something even more distinctly nomothetic to 
emerge from their own historical studies. Beginning with the claim that they had proved that 
evolution had occurred, they have turned to the past with the confidence that it would yield 
theoretical illumination as well as historical chronicle" (K~tts, 139); see also Futuyma, 102. 
"Futuyma, 108-119; Laudan, 58-59. 
68For an introduction to the process of  speciation, see Grant, 191-272. 
experimental biologist, the process is hopelessly slow. After all, no utterly 
convincing case of true speciation (that is, involving sexually reproducing 
organisms) has as yet emanated from a genetics lab."69 It seems, then, that there 
is no test as yet corroborating the mechanism of macroevo1ution.70 In other 
words, the certainty about evolution does not stand on empirical test, 
experiment or observation. It stands in its "rationality" or explanatory p~wer .~ '  
What is the "rationahty" or explanatory power of the evolutionary theory? 
Bunge summarizes what evolutionary theory does by remarking that the fact that 
most scientific hypotheses are stated in a categorical mode should not 
mislead us. When the biologist states that life emerged 2 billon years ago, that 
the first terrestrial organisms were lichens, that plants synthesize 
carbohydrates out of carbon dioxide and water, that oxygen is indispensable 
for animal life, or that all mammals are homeothermal, he is not convging 
infomation about experience but is stating hypotheses by means of which certain 
chunks ofexperience can k interpreted his assumptions, being hypotheses, are not 
about experience but about nonexperientiable facts, and he will employ them 
in order to explain his biological experience (emphasis supplied).72 
The "powery' by which evolution grips scientists and society rests on its coherent 
account of a considerable amount of what scientists consider "hrm" knowledge, 
acquired by many sciences through a long period of time, by way of a single 
metanarrative e~~lanation.'~ So, the more evolution matches the index of reality7j 
of our culture, the less scientists and the general public may consider 
70Microevolution, i.e., changes within a species, has been discovered and tested by biologists. 
711n his apology of evolution against creationism, Abusing Science: The Case agaittst Creationim, 
evolutionist epistemologist Philip Kitcher makes considerable effort to counteract the creationist 
claim that evolution is not a science because it cannot be falsified (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
19823, 30-49). My point here is not that evolutionism is not a science-it obviously is-but that 
the certainty of its results is not rationally compulsive even by scientific standards. When it comes 
to scientific criteria, however, even scientists do not agree, and each one applies what works in his 
or her field and specific research project. Kitcher explicitly recognizes that evolutionary theory has 
not been corroborated by stating that "if one accepts the idea that science requires proof, or if one 
adopts the naive falsificationist criterion, then the theory of evolution-and every other scientific 
theory-will turn out not to be a part of science" (ibid., 49). 
72Mario Bunge, Scienttfic Research I: The Searchfor Syslem (Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1967), 225. 
73c'What, in the end, drives evolution? As the answers to these and many other questions 
unfold, we begin to converge on a coherent theory that links the evolution of life with the physical 
history of the pIanet-not as a long series of isolated events, but in regular, repeated, law like 
patterns that can be generalized into a coherent theory of physical and organic evolutionary 
process. Along the way, we also see how process is inferred from pattern-the fundamental 
ingredient of genuine scientific discovery" (Eldredge, 7). 
74"Narratives derive their authority from two different sources: from the text and from the 
author. The authority of the text is simply a function of the index of reality that it manifests. The 
higher the index, the more authority we grant it. But text with a low index might yet be given 
greater authority because of the author" wchards, 30); "Darwin's implicit strategy, though, was 
to blur the distinction between narratives of an imaginative character that expressly made the case 
he wanted to advance but having a low index of reality, with those of higher index" (ibid., 26). 
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corroboration or testing necessary to accept it.75 It just makes too much sense to 
be wr0ng.7~ The corroboration, then, is rational because the theory stands on its 
inner consistency and outer coherence within the general "web" of "firm" 
knowledge accepted by Western culture?' In the corroboration of 
macroevolutionary theory, the "web of belief' replaces empirical testability. 
But the rationality or inner consistency of evolutionary theory, with data 
such as the fossil record, is still in the making.78 One could have assumed that 
if inconsistencies arise then the theory could be falsified. When inconsistencies 
arise in evolutionary theory, however, scientists do not abandon the theory, but 
patch it up by producing other hypotheses and theories that might smooth 
them out. This being the case, we need to ask whether evolutionary theory is 
falsifiable. According to Popper, 
a system must  b e  described UJ coqbiex ofthe highest degree if, in accordance with 
conventionalist practice, o n e  holds fast t o  it a s  a system established forever 
which one  is determined t o  rescue, whenever it  is in  danger, by the 
introduction o f  auxiliary hypotheses. For  the degree o f  falsifiability o f  a 
system thus protected is equal to  xero (emphasis 
It seems, then, that the inner consistency and explanatory power of a 
theory justify it. The higher its power, the less likely it is to be rejected by the 
scientific community and the general public. The explanatory power of 
evolutionary theory accounts for its hold on contemporary scientists and 
society. Even though all theories are revisable, not all theories are equal, argues 
Kitcher. "Even though our present evidence does not prove that evolutionary 
biology--or quantum physics, or plate tectonics, or any other theory-is 
true-evolutionary biologists will maintain that the present evidence is 
overwhelmingly in favor of their theory and overwhelmgly against its 
75For instance, commenting on Gould's proposal for fine-tuning evolutionary theory, IGtts, 
143, affirms that "there is a significant way in which macro-evolutionary theories must be 
dependent. Paleontology can provide knowledge not only of events, but of patterns and trends 
among events. It cannot provide justification for the claim that any of its generalizations have 
explanatory efficacy; that they are, among other things, projected. The justification must come, as 
it does in geology, from showing that the generalizations are comprehended by theories which, by 
common consent, have such efficacy." 
76"The higher the index of reality, the more the readers are invited to step beyond the 
particular history text to test the adequacy of its claims. Though, paradoxically, the higher the index 
the more the text suggests that readers need not accept the invitation, for a high index also brings 
greater authority and confidence in the truths of the narrative" Wchards, 25). 
"Kitcher, 48-49, 130, attempts to salvage the scientific status of evolution by calling on its 
power of explanation and its comprehensive theoretical reach and complexity; for a summary of 
the explanatory power of evolution, see Tim Berra, Evohtion and the Myth o/Creationism: A Aakc 
Guide to the Fads in the Evolutjon Debate (Standford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990), 52-69. 
7BConsider, for instance, that "although each side in the notorious dispute between those who 
subscribe to punctuated equilibrium and those who subscribe to gradualism points to paleontology 
in support of their position, there are enormous contingent barriers which stand in the way of 
resolving the issue on evidence provided by the fossil record" (Kitts, 142). 
79Karl R. Popper, The Logic ofScient$c Discovey, rev. ed. (London: Hutchinson, 1959), 145. 
supposed rivals."80 We should not understand Kitcher's phrase "present 
evidence" as a reference to experimentation or observation, but to the general 
status of our not-so-fum, scientific, theoretical, revisable knowledge. Moreover, 
the explanatory power and rationality of evolution do not corroborate it or 
make it true; they only make it persuasive. 
It is obvious that creationism hnds the same lirmtations about 
corroboration and falsifiability. Will we reach a point in which the controversy 
about the understanding of origins will be solved? 
Believing the Myfb @f~tanawative) 
That evolution's hold on the scientific community stems from its explanatory 
power is only part of the equation. We need to consider also that the issues 
evolution explains are necessary for our human experience. In other words, we 
need to have an answer to the cosmogony question in order to understand our 
world and our own beings. This has always been so. Religion and philosophy deal 
with cosmogonies and cosmologies, and the output that comes from religious and 
philosophical discussion is referred to as worldviews." Our understanding of the 
origination of the world and its nature are part of the macro-herrneneutical 
assumptions that guide our understanding of human affairs, the operation of 
human reason:* and even the construction of Christian theology. 
Since both evolution and creation are commensurable, underdetermined 
theories attempting to explain the history of our planet:) we should not use 
them as presuppositions when considering other issues-theoretical or 
practical. We should not use them because we have no certainty about their 
truthfulness. Yet, we are forced to choose and in practice accept one of the 
competing theories as absolutely true. This acceptance is not based on reason 
or method, but on faith, i.e., on the relative confidence we personally place on 
the theory we adopt as being the most persuasive explanation of reality. 
Epistemologically speaking, then, the basic difference between creation and 
evolution is not rational, but methodologcal. Methodologically, creation and 
evolution differ in the source producing the metanarrative about the origins of the 
"Kitcher, 34. 
"For a detailed conceptual and historical analysis of the notion of worldview, see David K. 
Naugle, WorHuiew: The Hishy $a Concept (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002). 
82See, for instance, how the acceptance of evolution makes an evolutionary approach to 
epistemology possible in Gerard Radnitzky and W. W. Bartley 111, eds., Evohtionaty Episfemohgv, 
Rationu&, and the .focio/bgy ofKnowhdge (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1987). 
""But it is only on the basis of an agreed-upon external constraint that we can engage in 
rational debate about what the fossil record tells us. Of course, there may be perfectly legitimate 
disagreements about the character and extent of the restriction to be applied, but they are prior to 
an assessment of the fossil record. The dispute between evolutionists and biblical creationists is 
only the most incoherent of ail of those about the meaning of the fossil record that have arisen 
outside the boundaries of an agreed-upon external constraintJ' (K~tts, 140-141). The incoherence 
of the debate comes from the macro-hermeneutical presuppositions and the index of reality derived 
from them that each party brings to the table. In short, they approach the issue with different 
rational and methodologxal a priories. 
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universe. Evolution's source is natural, our interpretation from the scattered traces 
of the past. Creation springs from divine revelation, God's summary account of 
his handiwork." Both work on tacit metaphysical and theoretical macro- and 
meso-presuppositions. Both attempt to understand the same subject matter or 
reality. Both use rational procedures in reading the scattered traces fiom the past. 
The difference boils down to a different "index of reality." Creationists have a 
broader index of reality than evolutionists. The former includes God and his 
revelation, while the latter excludes them. No wonder the interpretations are 
different. This divergence about the index of reality becomes the leading macro- 
herrneneutical difference between the two conflicting metanarratives. 
When evolutionism becomes a presupposition to explain other areas of 
reality, it ceases to be a scientific theory and becomes a metaphysical or religious 
belief we accept by a leap of faith. To criticize theories becomes increasingly 
difficult when we use them as presuppositions to interpret other fields of reality 
because we have made them the foundation of our entire intellectual position. 
Mhen we use them in this way, they become absolute truth for us. Of course, 
when we speak of faith, theologians are on their own turf, while scientists have 
left theirs behmd. The sooner scientists and theologians understand the macro- 
hermeneutical role of cosmology, and that faith, not reason, is required for its 
application, the sooner the far-reaching consequences of the creation-evolution 
debate will be understood. Creation and evolution are not only competing in the 
scientific attempt to interpret the history of our planet, but as they elicit our 
assent, they become metanarratives we accept by faith and use to build our 
understandmg of the world and of Christian theology. Each alternative generates 
conflictmg views of the entire world of human experience. 
Creation and evolution are metanarratives in conflict. In classical times we 
would have seen them as conflicting metaphysical teachings. Neither is 
irrational, because each makes sense of the same broad chunks of reality. Each 
has been produced by appropriate methodological procedures accepted in its 
own field of research. Only by making the scientific a priori absolute can we say 
that creation and the metanarrative it elicits are not scientific. But the scientific 
absolute stands only on the consensus of the scientific community, not on the 
absolute dictates of reason or scientific methodology. The truth is that each is 
an equally persuasive account of reality as a whole. The conflict between them, 
then, d l  never be solved rationally, only escha t~ lo~ica l l~ .~~  
The power and reliability of science stands on its method. From our brief 
analysis of scientific methodology in general part  I), we have discovered that 
T h i s  makes biblical creation substantially different from Plato's account of creation. The 
former claims to originate in God, the latter in Plato's scientific explanation. 
"It seems to me this issue will be eschatologically decided. If the God of  Scripture is God 
he will manifest himself in space and time at the end of human history to fulfill his promises and 
renew our planet with the creative power by which he brought it into existence. At that time the 
creation theory will be corroborated and verified. 
scientific method reaches its highest level of reliability and predictability when 
it is applied to the present, repetitive phenomena of nature. Yet even at its 
hghest level of certainty scientific methodology is always an interpretation 
dependent on hermeneutical a priories that prevent it from dmovering absolute 
inerrant truth from empirically generated data. Scientific methodology applied 
to recurrent natural processes produces tentative explanations of reality, which 
should not be accepted dogmatically, but be critically examined, modified, 
rejected, and rePlacedmg6 
From the concise analysis of the way in whch scientific methodology is used 
to build evolutionary theory the epistemological htat ions become more 
prominent. Among others, a & lunitation springs from the absence of the 
object of study, which, being past, stands beyond observation and 
experimentation. The historicity of its object forces scientists to rely heady on 
inferences from what is accessible to them in the present (fossils, rocks, live 
organisms). From these empirically accessible sources of data scientists 
reconstruct the natural history of our planet in the form of a secular 
metanarrative. Such reconstruction has a very low level of rational certainty based 
on empirical evidence. For secular society, however, scientists play the role of 
prophets, and evolutionary metanarrative is received as cultural dogma imbued 
with a degree of certainty alien to scientific methodology. Evolution becomes a 
myth, scientific theory a fact. When evolution becomes dogma, faith replaces 
reason and science turns into religon. 
We are now in a position to answer the question proposed at the beginning 
of this article: Is the epistemological certainty of evolutionary theory so absolute 
that Chnstian theologians should feel rationally compelled to accept its 
conclusions even if they explicitly contradxt the teachings of biblical revelation 
on the origin of life on our planet?87 The answer is clear: Scientific methodology 
and rationahty do not reach a degree of certainty that compels Chnstian 
theologians to accept evolutionary theory as a fact to whch biblical teachmgs 
should be ac~ornrnodated?~ The rationahty of scientific methodology has the 
power to claim evolutionary theory as a possible explanation of the highly 
complex question of or ips .  Yet, it clearly falls short of malung its explanation 
absolutely certain, thereby necessitating the assent of all rational beings. Why, 
then, should Christian and Adventist theologians feel compelled to accommodate 
Scripture to the parameters dictated by the evolutionary metanarrative? 
Canale, 98-99. 
"In this article, we are considering the science-theology relation only in regard to the 
cosmolo~cal questions of origins. However, the answer given to this relation extends to all issues 
on which science and Scripture have parallel pronouncements. 
"Fritz Guy represents a sector of Adventist theologians and scientists convinced that 
evolution is a fact and that we should interpret Scripture and Christian doctrine accordingly 
(Ynterpreting Genesis One in the Twenty-first Century," Specfnrm 31, no. 2 [2003]: 5-16). 
